Deborah Mayo
Virginia Tech
Kuhn maintains that what marks the transition to a science is the ability to carry out ‘normal’ science—a practice he characterizes as abandoning the kind of testing that Popper lauds as the hallmark of science. Examining Kuhn's own contrast with Popper, I propose to recast Kuhnian normal science. Thus recast, it is seen to consist of severe and reliable tests of low-level experimental hypotheses (normal tests) and is, indeed, the place to look to demarcate science. While thereby vindicating Kuhn on demarcation, my recasting of normal science is seen to tell against Kuhn's view of revolutionary science.
Keywords Demarcation   Philosophy of Science   Popper   Kuhn
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DOI 10.1093/bjps/47.2.271
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References found in this work BETA

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1962 - University of Chicago Press.
Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge.Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave (eds.) - 1970 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Error Statistics and Duhem's Problem.Gregory R. Wheeler - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (3):410-420.

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