Synthesis Philosophica 34 (1):157-172 (2019)
Authors |
|
Abstract |
In contemporary philosophy of mind, the conceivability argument against physicalism is often used to support a form of dualism, which takes consciousness to be ontologically fundamental and distinct from physical matter. Recently, some proponents of the conceivability argument have also shown interest in panpsychism, which is the view that mentality is ubiquitous in the natural world. This paper examines the extent to which panpsychism can be sustained if the conceivability argument is taken seriously. I argue that panpsychism’s ubiquity claim permits a strong reading or a weak reading. This presents a dilemma. On the one hand, the strong reading, which is typically characterised as a form of monism, is undermined by the conceivability argument. On the other hand, the weak reading, while compatible with the conceivability argument, turns out just to be a special case of dualism. I also show that the related position of panprotopsychism cannot provide a tenable monist position because it too cannot withstand the challenge of the conceivability argument. Therefore, if the conceivability argument is taken seriously, then we are committed to a dualist metaphysics, regardless of whether or not we accept the ubiquity claim.
|
Keywords | philosophy of mind consciousness dualism panpsychism conceivability argument |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
Naming and Necessity: Lectures Given to the Princeton University Philosophy Colloquium.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press.
The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory.David J. Chalmers - 1996 - Oxford University Press.
View all 41 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
Similar books and articles
Conceivability, Possibility, and a Posteriori Necessity: On Chalmers' Argument for Dualism.Karol Polcyn - 2006 - Diametros 7:37-55.
Chalmers' Conceivability Argument for Dualism.Anthony L. Brueckner - 2001 - Analysis 61 (3):187-193.
Conceiving Mind: A Critique of Descartes' Dualism and Contemporary Immaterialist Views of Consciousness.Kristin P. Schaupp - 2004 - Dissertation, Marquette University
Conceivability and the Cartesian Argument for Dualism.James van Cleve - 1983 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (January):35-45.
Physicalism, Conceivability and Strong Necessities.Jesper Kallestrup - 2006 - Synthese 151 (2):273-295.
The Inconceivable Popularity of Conceivability Arguments.Douglas I. Campbell, Jack Copeland & Zhuo-Ran Deng - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (267):223-240.
Conceiving What is Not There.Andrew Botterell - 2001 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (8):21-42.
Physicalism Unfalsified: Chalmers' Inconclusive Argument for Dualism.Andrew Melnyk - 2001 - In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press. pp. 331-349.
Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem.Katalin Balog - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (4):497-528.
Correct Conceivability and its Role in the Epistemology of Modality.Robert Michels - 2020 - Les Principes Métaphysiques.
Powerful Qualities, the Conceivability Argument and the Nature of the Physical.Henry Taylor - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (8):1895-1910.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2021-04-16
Total views
12 ( #809,638 of 2,507,636 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #169,938 of 2,507,636 )
2021-04-16
Total views
12 ( #809,638 of 2,507,636 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #169,938 of 2,507,636 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads