Why the no‐miracles argument fails

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 12 (3):263 – 279 (1998)
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Abstract

The chief argument for scientific realism is the no-miracles argument, according to which the approximate truth of our current scientific theories can be inferred from their success through time. To date, anti-realist responses to the argument have been unconvincing, largely because of their anti-realistic presuppositions. In this paper, it is shown that realists cannot pre-emptively dismiss the problem of the underdetermination of theory by evidence, and that the no-miracles argument fails because it does nothing to dispel the threat posed by underdetermination, although it may be effective against other anti-realistic arguments.

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Carl Alan Matheson
University of Manitoba

Citations of this work

Partial convergence and approximate truth.Duncan Macintosh - 1994 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (1):153-170.
The Challenge of Scientific Realism to Intelligent Design.Christian Carman - 2022 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 14 (4):42-69.

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References found in this work

The scientific image.C. Van Fraassen Bas - 1980 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The Scientific Image.William Demopoulos & Bas C. van Fraassen - 1982 - Philosophical Review 91 (4):603.
A confutation of convergent realism.Larry Laudan - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (1):19-49.
A Confutation of Convergent Realism.Larry Laudan - 1980 - In Yuri Balashov & Alexander Rosenberg (eds.), Philosophy of Science: Contemporary Readings. Routledge. pp. 211.

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