Fame and Redemption: On the Moral Dangers of Celebrity Apologies

Journal of Social Philosophy (2023)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this paper, I first consider three possible explanations for why celebrities typically apologise publicly and sometimes also include their fans among the targets of their apology. I then identify three moral dangers of celebrity apologies, the third of which arises specifically for fan-targeted apologies, and each of which teaches us important lessons about the practice of celebrity apologies. From these individual lessons, I draw more general lessons about apologies from those with elevated social positions and the powers they are associated with.

Similar books and articles

Ethics of Global Internet, Community and Fame Addiction.Chong Ju Choi & Ron Berger - 2009 - Journal of Business Ethics 85 (2):193-200.
Talent, Skill, and Celebrity.Catherine M. Robb & Alfred Archer - 2022 - Ethical Perspectives 29 (1):33-63.
Celebrity manufacture theory: Revisiting the theorization of celebrity culture.Jonathan Matusitz & Demi Simi - 2021 - Empedocles European Journal for the Philosophy of Communication 12 (2):129-144.
Fame.Emma Bell - unknown
Being a Celebrity: A Phenomenology of Fame.David Giles & Donna Rockwell - 2009 - Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 40 (2):178-210.
Fame as a Value Concept.Douglas P. Lackey - 1986 - Philosophy Research Archives 12:541-551.
Fame as a Value Concept.Douglas P. Lackey - 1986 - Philosophy Research Archives 12:541-551.
Fame.Mark Rowlands - 2008 - Acumen Publishing.
Elias canetti and T. S. Eliot on fame.Suzanne Smith - 2010 - Philosophy and Literature 34 (1):pp. 145-160.
Cultures of Fame and Fandom.Frances Bonner - 2011 - Cultural Studies Review 14 (1).

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-01-16

Downloads
365 (#52,864)

6 months
157 (#18,884)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Benjamin Matheson
University of Bern

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Moral Grandstanding.Justin Tosi & Brandon Warmke - 2016 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 44 (3):197-217.
Trust as an affective attitude.Karen Jones - 1996 - Ethics 107 (1):4-25.
Acting for the right reasons.Julia Markovits - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (2):201-242.
Unprincipled virtue—synopsis.Nomy Arpaly - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (3):429-431.
Moral Worth and Moral Knowledge.Paulina Sliwa - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (2):393-418.

View all 16 references / Add more references