Ways to Be Blameworthy: Rightness, Wrongness, and Responsibility

Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press (2019)
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Elinor Mason draws on ethics and responsibility theory to present a pluralistic view of both wrongness and blameworthiness. Mason argues that our moral concepts, rightness and wrongness, must be connected to our responsibility concepts. But the connection is not simple. She identifies three different ways to be blameworthy, corresponding to different ways of acting wrongly. The paradigmatic way to be blameworthy is to act subjectively wrongly. Mason argues for an account of subjective obligation that is connected to the notion of trying - to act rightly is try to do well by morality, to act wrongly (and to be blameworthy) is to fail to try hard enough. Trying involves understanding morality, those who do not grasp morality are in a different category. So agents might also be blameworthy for being oriented away from what really matters. In that case, agents are blameworthy in a different sense, the detached sense. Finally, we can become blameworthy by taking responsibility in cases where our agency is ambiguous. In the final section, Mason gives us an account of taking responsibility and agues that that is an important art of our responsibility practices.



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Moral responsibility.Andrew Eshleman - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Praise.Daniel Telech - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 17 (10):1-19.
Praise as Moral Address.Daniel Telech - 2021 - Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility 7.

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