Presentism and the Special Theory

Philo 11 (1):19-49 (2008)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Presentism—the thesis that only those things that are present exist—seems to face an insurmountable barrier in the Special Theory ofRelativity (STR). For the STR entails that simultaneity, and so the present, are relative to inertial frame. But if the present is the real and the present is relative, so too is in the real relative. But this cannot be. The real is absolute. But what is the Presentist to do? I suggest that she craft an alternative to the STR that is empirically equivalent to it but makes rooms for a present, and a real, that are absolute.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,616

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

A defense of presentism in a relativistic setting.Mark Hinchliff - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (3):586.
The Present vs. the Specious Present.Jiri Benovsky - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (2):193-203.
No Time Travel for Presentists.Steven D. Hales - 2010 - Logos and Episteme 1 (2):353-360.
Review: Presentism and Relativity. [REVIEW]Yuri Balashov & Michel Janssen - 2003 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (2):327-346.
Presentism and relativity. [REVIEW]Yuri Balashov & Michel Janssen - 2003 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (2):327-346.
A Defense of Transient Presentism.M. Oreste Fiocco - 2007 - American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (3):191 - 212.
Presentism and Grounding Past Truths.Matthew Davidson - 2013 - In Roberto Ciuni, Giuliano Torrengo & Kristie Miller (eds.), New Papers on the Present: Focus on Presentism. Verlag. pp. 153-172.
Semantic externalism and presentism.Yuval Dolev - 2008 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (4):533 – 557.
Why Does Time Pass?Bradford Skow - 2011 - Noûs 46 (2):223-242.

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-01-09

Downloads
45 (#311,164)

6 months
3 (#445,838)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Franklin Mason
Purdue University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references