From data to phenomena: a Kantian stance

Synthese 182 (1):101-116 (2011)
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Abstract

This paper investigates some metaphysical and epistemological assumptions behind Bogen and Woodward’s data-to-phenomena inferences. I raise a series of points and suggest an alternative possible Kantian stance about data-to-phenomena inferences. I clarify the nature of the suggested Kantian stance by contrasting it with McAllister’s view about phenomena as patterns in data sets

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2009-07-11

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Michela Massimi
University of Edinburgh

Citations of this work

Entity Realism Meets Perspectivism.Mahdi Khalili - 2023 - Acta Analytica 39 (1):79-95.
What distinguishes data from models?Sabina Leonelli - 2019 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 9 (2):22.
What distinguishes data from models?Sabina Leonelli - 2019 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 9 (2):22.

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References found in this work

Kritik der reinen Vernunft.Immanuel Kant - 2020 - Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co KG.
Epistemology and cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Knowledge and the flow of information.F. Dretske - 1989 - Trans/Form/Ação 12:133-139.

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