Do the Right Thing

In Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 7. pp. 117-135 (2017)
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Abstract

Subjective rightness (or ‘ought’ or obligation) seems to be the sense of rightness that should be action guiding where more objective senses fail. However, there is an ambiguity between strong and weak senses of action guidance. No general account of subjective rightness can succeed in being action guiding in a strong sense by providing an immediately helpful instruction, because helpfulness always depends on the context. Subjective rightness is action guiding in a weaker sense, in that it is always accessible and comprehensible to the agent. Hence traditional belief formulations say roughly, “do what you believe is best.” This is not yet a satisfactory formulation, because it cannot make sense of our ongoing subjective duty to improve our beliefs. The notion of ‘trying’ does capture the dynamic and diachronic nature of our subjective obligation. Thus, we should formulate subjective obligation in terms of trying: “try to do well by morality.”

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Citations of this work

Decision-making under moral-uncertainty.Andrew Sepielli - 2018 - In Aaron Zimmerman, Karen Jones & Mark Timmons (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Moral Epistemology. New York: Routledge.

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References found in this work

Brainstorms.Daniel C. Dennett - 1978 - MIT Press.
An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation.Jeremy Bentham - 1780 - New York: Dover Publications. Edited by J. H. Burns & H. L. A. Hart.
Freedom Within Reason.Susan R. Wolf - 1990 - New York: Oup Usa.
Brainstorms.Daniel Dennett - 1978 - Philosophy of Science 47 (2):326-327.

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