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Abstract
In the philosophy of mind, the causal relationship between phenomenal consciousness, mentation and brain states has always been a matter of debate. On the one hand, material monism posits consciousness and mind as pure brain-epiphenomena. One of its most stringent lines of reasoning relies on the premise that because a cerebral impairment, or its anatomical and biochemical modification, leads to a cognitive impairment and/or altered states of consciousness, there is no reason to doubt the mind-brain identity. On the other hand, dualism or idealism (in one form or another) regard consciousness and mind as something other than the sole product of cerebral activity pointing at the ineffable and undefinable seemingly unphysical nature of our subjective qualitative experience and its related mental dimension. Here, we argue that the premise of material monism is based on a logical correlation-causation fallacy and will review some neuroscientific and biological findings that question the idea that posits phenomenal experience as an emergent property of brain activity. While these (mostly ignored) findings, if considered separately from each other, could, in principle, be recast into a physicalist paradigm, once viewed from an integral perspective, they substantiate equally well, if not even more effectively, an ontology that posits mind and consciousness as a primal phenomenon.
Keywords philosophy pf mind  hard problem of consciousness  consciousness  material monism  dualism  biology  neuroscience  physicalism  mind body problem  idealism
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A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness.Bernard J. Baars - 1988 - Cambridge University Press.

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