Abstract

The primary purpose of this dissertation is to argue that an objective concept of happiness is the only viable concept of happiness for an ethical system. The first two chapters consist of foundational work for this task. ;The primary focus is on Aristotle since he gives the most detailed explanation of an objective conception of happiness. I argue that his account is too rigid and elitist for twentieth century use, and that the Stoic conception of happiness is more appropriate for our purpose. The Stoic account of happiness is less rigid and elitist and, therefore, makes living a happy life more accessible to a broader range of people. There are three reasons why the Stoics offer a better objective account of happiness than Aristotle. First, their account of wisdom is less rigid, hence, virtue is attainable for a broader class of people. Second, their concept of a "world community" avoids the elitism inherent in Aristotle's account. Finally, their account of the need for external goods diminishes the need for things like money in order to be happy. ;The primary focus of the subjective account is based on Utilitarianism. An in depth analysis is made of four thinkers: Hume, Bentham, Mill, and Sidgwick. The primary argument is that the subjective account is not viable for use in an ethical system. I offer three reasons to support this claim. First, on a subjective account the concept of happiness has no clear meaning, it is either vague or ambiguous or both. Second, the synonymy of pleasure and happiness is wrong because it is possible to be happy without feeling pleasure. Third, their concepts of character and virtue are useless because of the consequentialist nature of Utilitarianism. ;Kant is examined because of his claim that happiness cannot function as a foundation for an ethical system. I argue that Kant's concept of happiness is ambiguous. One can find four or five different uses he makes of the term, all with different purposes. I argue that his ambiguity destroys his claim