Dialogue 36 (1):177- (1997)
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| DOI | 10.1017/s0012217300009380 |
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References found in this work BETA
Essays on Actions and Events: Philosophical Essays Volume 1.Donald Davidson - 1970 - Clarendon Press.
Concepts of Supervenience.Jaegwon Kim - 1984 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (December):153-76.
The Myth of Non-Reductive Materialism.Jaegwon Kim - 1989 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 63 (3):31-47.
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Citations of this work BETA
The Supervenience Argument.Juhani Yli-Vakkuri & Ausonio Marras - 2008 - In S. Gozzano & F. Oralia (eds.), Universals, Tropes and the Philosophy of Mind. Ontos Verlag. pp. 101-132.
A Defense of Nonreductive Mental Causation.Andrew Russo - 2013 - Dissertation, The University of Oklahoma
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