Personality Disorders and Moral Responsibility

Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 17 (2):127-129 (2010)
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In “Personality Disorders: Moral or Medical Kinds—or Both?” Peter Zachar and Nancy Nyquist Potter (2010) reject any general dichotomy between morality and mental health, and specifically between character vices and personality disorders. In doing so, they provide a nuanced and illuminating discussion that connects Aristotelian virtue ethics to a multidimensional understanding of personality disorders. I share their conviction that dissolving morality–health dichotomies is the starting point for any plausible understanding of human beings (Martin 2006), but I register some qualms about their discussion of responsibility. Zachar and Potter target the morality-health dichotomy as it appears in Louis C. ..



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Mike Martin
University College London

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From personality disorders to the fact-value distinction.Konrad Banicki - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (2):274-298.

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