Pains as reasons
Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2261-2274 (2015)
Abstract
Imperativism is the view that the phenomenal character of the affective component of pains, orgasms, and pleasant or unpleasant sensory experience depends on their imperative intentional content. In this paper I canvass an imperativist treatment of pains as reason-conferring statesAuthor's Profile
DOI
10.1007/s11098-014-0408-7
My notes
Similar books and articles
Reasons and Theories of Sensory Affect.Murat Aydede & Matthew Fulkerson - 2019 - In David Bain, Michael Brady & Jennifer Corns (eds.), The Philosophy of Pain: Unpleasantness, Emotion, and Deviance. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 27-59.
Imperatives, phantom pains, and hallucination by presupposition.Colin Klein - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (6):917-928.
Response to Tumulty on Pain and Imperatives.Colin Klein - 2010 - Journal of Philosophy 107 (10):554-557.
Pains and reasons: Why it is rational to kill the Messenger.Brian Cutter & Michael Tye - 2014 - Philosophical Quarterly 64 (256):423-433.
Imperative content and the painfulness of pain.Manolo Martínez - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (1):67-90.
Controversies in neuroscience V: Persistent pain: Neuronal mechanisms and clinical implications: Introduction.Bill Roberts, Paul Cordo & Stevan Harnad - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (3):0-0.
Mad pain and Martian pain.David Lewis - 1980 - In Ned Block (ed.), Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology. Harvard University Press. pp. 216-222.
Analytics
Added to PP
2014-11-22
Downloads
340 (#34,654)
6 months
18 (#59,673)
2014-11-22
Downloads
340 (#34,654)
6 months
18 (#59,673)
Historical graph of downloads
Author's Profile
Citations of this work
Reasons and Theories of Sensory Affect.Murat Aydede & Matthew Fulkerson - 2019 - In David Bain, Michael Brady & Jennifer Corns (eds.), The Philosophy of Pain: Unpleasantness, Emotion, and Deviance. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 27-59.
More of me! Less of me!: Reflexive Imperativism about Affective Phenomenal Character.Luca Barlassina & Max Khan Hayward - 2019 - Mind 128 (512):1013-1044.
Not Only a Messenger: Towards an Attitudinal‐Representational Theory of Pain.Hilla Jacobson - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (2):382-408.
References found in this work
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1984 - MIT Press.
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1984 - Behaviorism 14 (1):51-56.
