Pains as reasons

Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2261-2274 (2015)
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Abstract

Imperativism is the view that the phenomenal character of the affective component of pains, orgasms, and pleasant or unpleasant sensory experience depends on their imperative intentional content. In this paper I canvass an imperativist treatment of pains as reason-conferring states

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10.1007/s11098-014-0408-7

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Manolo Martínez
Universitat de Barcelona

Citations of this work

Why Take Painkillers?David Bain - 2019 - Noûs 53 (2):462-490.
Reasons and Theories of Sensory Affect.Murat Aydede & Matthew Fulkerson - 2018 - In David Bain, Michael Brady & Jennifer Corns (eds.), Philosophy of Pain. London: Routledge. pp. 27-59.
Recent Work on Pain.Jennifer Corns - 2018 - Analysis 78 (4):737-753.
Pain signals are predominantly imperative.Manolo Martínez & Colin Klein - 2016 - Biology and Philosophy 31 (2):283-298.

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References found in this work

The intrinsic quality of experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.
Reality and representation.David Papineau - 1987 - New York: Blackwell.

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