On theoretical constructs and Ramsey constants

Philosophy of Science 33 (1/2):1-13 (1966)
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Abstract

The method of Ramsey sentences has been proposed for handling theoretical constructs within a scientific system. Essentially it consists of constructing a certain "monolithic" sentence for an entire theory. In this present paper several improvements are suggested which help to overcome some of the awkward features of the method. In particular we have here many Ramsey sentences rather than just one, each erstwhile primitive theoretical term giving rise to a Ramsey sentence. Such a sentence in effect defines what we call a Ramsey constant. Using Ramsey constants, we attempt to improve the method in important logical and semantical respects. It is suggested also that such constants are of interest for the philosophy of mathematics

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Citations of this work

Truth, Ramsification, and the Pluralist's Revenge.Cory Wright - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2):265–283.
Communication by Ramsey-sentence clause.Herbert G. Bohnert - 1967 - Philosophy of Science 34 (4):341-347.
Functionalism and self-consciousness.Mark McCullagh - 2000 - Mind and Language 15 (5):481-499.

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