Abstract

An action's illegality can be irrelevant to a reason not to perform it. A plausible example of a reason not to assault is that assault causes suffering. Since assault is illegal, the reason pertains to a legally proscribed action. Still, assault's illegality is irrelevant in this case: the reason would pertain even if assault were not legally proscribed. On the other hand, it appears that a reason can be one that derives from the interposition of law. This thesis is about reasons of this second type. In particular, it is about their formal features. For example, it is about their individuating conditions and about how legal reasons can be second-order rather than first-order. Most particularly, however, it is about their identity conditions. I argue against three widely-accepted claims about the nature of legal reasons: p is a legal reason only if p is a content-independent reason ; if p is a legal reason to ¢, p could be a complete reason to ¢ or a part of a complete reason to ¢ ; a legal reason p has a significant formal feature when p is an exclusionary reason. I also argue that one argument to the conclusion that analytical jurisprudence must pay special to attention moral legal reasons - an argument seen in recent work by R. A. Duff - is unconvincing.