Lies, Common Ground and Performative Utterances

Erkenntnis 88 (2):567-578 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In a recent book (_Lying and insincerity_, Oxford University Press, 2018), Andreas Stokke argues that one lies iff one says something one believes to be false, thereby proposing that it becomes common ground. This paper shows that Stokke’s proposal is unable to draw the right distinctions about insincere performative utterances. The objection also has repercussions on theories of assertion, because it poses a novel challenge to any attempt to define assertion as a proposal to update the common ground.

Similar books and articles

Lying, speech acts, and commitment.Neri Marsili - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):3245-3269.
Lying and Insincerity.Andreas Stokke - 2018 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Lying and Certainty.Neri Marsili - 2018 - In Jörg Meibauer (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Lying. Oxford University Press. pp. 170-182.
Lying by Promising. A study on insincere illocutionary acts.Neri Marsili - 2016 - International Review of Pragmatics 8 (2):271-313.
Bending and Stretching the Definition of Lying.Martina Blečić - 2020 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 20 (2):247-256.
You don't say! Lying, asserting and insincerity.Neri Marsili - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Sheffield
Metaphors and Martinis: a response to Jessica Keiser.Andreas Stokke - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):853-859.
The Limits of Acceptance.Jessica Keiser - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
Lying, Belief, and Knowledge.Matthew A. Benton - 2019 - In Jörg Meibauer (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Lying. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 120-133.
Lying and Asserting.Andreas Stokke - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy 110 (1):33-60.
Proposing, Pretending, and Propriety: A Response to Don Fallis.Andreas Stokke - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (1):178-183.
The Definition of Lying and Deception.James Edwin Mahon - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Immoral lies and partial beliefs.Neri Marsili - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (1):117-127.
Intentionalism and Bald-Faced Lies.Daniel W. Harris - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.

Analytics

Added to PP
2021-02-28

Downloads
595 (#25,531)

6 months
135 (#19,982)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Neri Marsili
Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia

Citations of this work

Lying, speech acts, and commitment.Neri Marsili - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):3245-3269.
Group Assertions and Group Lies.Neri Marsili - 2023 - Topoi 42 (2):369-384.
Assertion: a (partly) social speech act.Neri Marsili & Mitchell Green - 2021 - Journal of Pragmatics 181 (August 2021):17-28.
Lying with Uninformative Speech Acts.Grzegorz Gaszczyk - 2022 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (7):746-760.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

How to do things with words.John Langshaw Austin - 1962 - Oxford [Eng.]: Clarendon Press. Edited by Marina Sbisá & J. O. Urmson.
Scorekeeping in a language game.David Lewis - 1979 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):339--359.
Assertion.Robert Stalnaker - 1978 - Syntax and Semantics (New York Academic Press) 9:315-332.

View all 40 references / Add more references