Erkenntnis:1-12 (forthcoming)

Authors
Neri Marsili
Universitat de Barcelona
Abstract
In a recent book (Lying and insincerity, Oxford University Press, 2018), Andreas Stokke argues that one lies iff one says something one believes to be false, thereby proposing that it becomes common ground. This paper shows that Stokke’s proposal is unable to draw the right distinctions about insincere performative utterances. The objection also has repercussions on theories of assertion, because it poses a novel challenge to any attempt to define assertion as a proposal to update the common ground.
Keywords Assertion  Performative Utterances  Speech Act Theory  Testimony  Deception  Lying  Insincerity  Definition of Lying  What is said  Commitment  Conversational scorekeeping
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-020-00368-4
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References found in this work BETA

Scorekeeping in a Language Game.David Lewis - 1979 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):339--359.
Assertion.Robert Stalnaker - 1978 - Syntax and Semantics (New York Academic Press) 9:315-332.

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Citations of this work BETA

Lying, Speech Acts, and Commitment.Neri Marsili - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):3245-3269.
Assertion: A (Partly) Social Speech Act.Neri Marsili & Mitchell Green - 2021 - Journal of Pragmatics 181 (August 2021):17-28.
Happy Unhappiness.Franca D’Agostini - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-18.

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Similar books and articles

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