Imperative content and the painfulness of pain

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (1):67-90 (2011)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Representationalist theories of phenomenal consciousness have problems in accounting for pain, for at least two reasons. First of all, the negative affective phenomenology of pain (its painfulness) does not seem to be representational at all. Secondly, pain experiences are not transparent to introspection in the way perceptions are. This is reflected, e.g. in the fact that we do not acknowledge pain hallucinations. In this paper, I defend that representationalism has the potential to overcome these objections. Defenders of representationalism have tried to analyse every kind of phenomenal character in terms of indicative contents. But there is another possibility: Affective phenomenology, in fact, depends on imperative representational content. This provides a satisfactory solution to the aforementioned difficulties

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,323

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Naturalism, introspection, and direct realism about pain.Murat Aydede - 2001 - Consciousness and Emotion 2 (1):29-73.
The Imperative View of Pain.David Bain - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (9-10):164-85.
In a state of pain.Paul Noordhof - 2005 - In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. Cambridge Ma: Bradford Book/Mit Press.
The Intentional Structure of Consciousness.Tim Crane - 2002 - In Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 33-56.
More in pain.Paul Noordhof - 2002 - Analysis 62 (2):153-154.
Response to Tumulty on Pain and Imperatives.Colin Klein - 2010 - Journal of Philosophy 107 (10):554-557.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-07-16

Downloads
269 (#76,354)

6 months
23 (#121,411)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Manolo Martínez
Universitat de Barcelona

Citations of this work

Teleological theories of mental content.Peter Schulte & Karen Neander - 2022 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
What makes pains unpleasant?David Bain - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):69-89.
Pain.Murat Aydede - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Why Take Painkillers?David Bain - 2019 - Noûs 53 (2):462-490.

View all 73 citations / Add more citations