It's a Colorful World

American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (1):71 - 80 (2006)
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Abstract

Abstract: I defend the intuition that the phenomenology of our experience is right in attributing the colors we see to objects; but although colors are properties of objects, they are constitutively dependent on the perceiver’s experiences. I offer a metaphysical account for this primitivist intuition, in response to David Chalmers’ arguments against it, drawing inspiration from Aristotle’s theory of causation.

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Anna Marmodoro
Durham University

Citations of this work

Aesthetic Properties as Powers.Vid Simoniti - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):1434-1453.

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