Abstract

Scholars are currently divided on the issue of whether, according to Hobbes, social collectivities such ascommonwealths or corporations are agents in their own right. In this paper I clarify Hobbes’s position onthe question of whether groups are agents. After distinguishing between several kinds of collective action, Ishow that Hobbes is not committed to the view that groups are agents in their own right. As an analysis ofthe terms “artificial person,” “actor,” and “sovereign” reveals, Hobbes is committed only to the view thatsome social collectivities simulate agency. I then argue that Hobbes’s theory of voluntary action isinconsistent with the claim that groups engage in voluntary actions. Finally, I consider how Hobbes’stheory of simulated collective agency might contribute to contemporary philosophical debates on the natureof collective action. I suggest that Hobbes’s theory could be most effectively applied to apparent cases ofcollective action for which current philosophical theories are inadequate.