Abstract

In Section I, I analyze the first formulation of Kant’s Categorical Imperative and the version of the moral self that this theory entails. In Section II, I demonstrate that Kant’s ethical theory dismisses as non-moral an agent who derives her sense of self from her particular context. I explain how the societal oppression of actual persons who understand their moral selves in this way leads feminists to reject Kant’s theory and to call for an alternative theory; I outline two criteria that such a theory must meet. Then, in Section III, I consider a feminist alternative to universalist ethical theory, the ethics of care of Joan Tronto. I argue that care ethics entails a relational moral self, and posing two objections to this version of the self, I prove it to be an insufficient model for the feminist project at hand. In Section IV, I consider a second alternative moral theory, narrative ethics, analyzing the deliberative framework put forth by Margaret Urban Walker. Next, in Section V, I argue that the narrative moral self is captured by Walker’s concept of the moral persona. This narrative moral self is relational, yet uses certain skills, such as analytic or reasoning skills, in moral decision-making. Finally, in Section VI I argue that narrative theory is the most useful tool for feminists who seek to define the moral person in terms of her concrete relationships to others, and I answer several objections to narrative theory