Deception in Sender–Receiver Games

Erkenntnis 80 (1):215-227 (2015)
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Abstract

Godfrey-Smith advocates for linking deception in sender-receiver games to the existence of undermining signals. I present games in which deceptive signals can be arbitrarily frequent, without this undermining information transfer between sender and receiver

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Manolo Martínez
Universitat de Barcelona

Citations of this work

The Brier Rule Is not a Good Measure of Epistemic Utility.Don Fallis & Peter J. Lewis - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):576-590.
Propositional content in signals.Brian Skyrms & Jeffrey A. Barrett - 2019 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 74 (C):34-39.
Deception: a functional account.Marc Artiga & Cédric Paternotte - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (3):579-600.

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References found in this work

Convention: A Philosophical Study.David Kellogg Lewis - 1969 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Evolution of the Social Contract.Brian Skyrms - 1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Signals.Brian Skyrms - 2008 - Philosophy of Science 75 (5):489-500.

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