Czy wnioski z eksperymentów naukowych badających wolną wolę są uzasadnione? Przegląd i analiza krytyki eksperymentów Benjamina Libeta i Johna-Dylana Haynesa

Argument: Biannual Philosophical Journal 6 (2):475-492 (2016)
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Abstract

Scientific experiments which try to examine free will are faced with various critical arguments — both philosophical and methodological. In this article I will present the most important and the most interesting critical arguments attacking two the most influential experiments: Benjamin Libet experiment and John‐Dylan Haynes experiment. In the first part of the article I will consider a particular criticism of Libet paradigm, which loses its importance in context of Haynes paradigm. Next I will present critical arguments which attack both Haynes and Libet experiments (and probably all other psychophysiological experiments facing free will problem). Because of this analysis I will consider informative value of presented experiments in context of existence of free will.

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