The Monist 72 (4):489-525 (1989)

Abstract
The procedure I will follow in this paper requires a brief initial note of explanation. Collingwood’s texts are opaque at two points. First, he does not make clear what precisely he meant by the claim that metaphysics is a historical discipline. The prevailing interpretation—which I dispute—has been that he had in mind a similarity or identity of certain methods of inquiry or explanation. Second, and more seriously, he does not make clear the relationship of his two main treatises on metaphysics. They were written and published only seven years apart and one feels there ought to be some connection, if only that of explicit rejection, between them. Their connection is problematic; for they appear, on the surface, very different. Rather like the relationship of Plato’s Laws to his Republic. But Collingwood himself is almost completely noncommittal on how they stand, each to the other. He apparently saw in them some sort of continuity. But beyond this we have no sense of what he took their relationship to be.
Keywords Collingwood   Metaphysics   Philosophy of History
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ISBN(s) 0026-9662
DOI 10.5840/monist198972431
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Ryle and Collingwood: Their Correspondence and its Philosophical Context.Charlotte Vrijen - 2006 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 14 (1):93 – 131.

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