Oxford University Press (2021)

Authors
Eric Marcus
Auburn University
Abstract
It is impossible to hold patently contradictory beliefs in mind together at once. Why? Because we know that it is impossible for both to be true. This impossibility is a species of rational necessity, a phenomenon that uniquely characterizes the relation between one person's beliefs. Here, Eric Marcus argues that the unity of the rational mind--what makes it one mind--is what explains why, given what we already believe, we can't believe certain things and must believe certain others in this special sense. What explains this is that beliefs, and the inferences by which we acquire them, are constituted by a particular kind of endorsement of those very states and acts. This, in turn, entails that belief and inference are essentially self-conscious: to hold a belief or to make an inference is at the same time to know that one does. An examination of the nature of belief and inference, in light of the phenomenon of rational necessity, reveals how the unity of the rational mind is a function of our knowledge of ourselves as bound to believe the true. Rational self-consciousness is the form of mental togetherness.
Keywords Belief, Truth, Law of Non-Contradiction, Assertion, Avowal, Moore’s Paradox, Self-Knowledge, Taking Condition, Inference, Carroll’s Paradox
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ISBN(s) 0192845632   9780192845634
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Inference as Consciousness of Necessity.Eric Marcus - 2020 - Analytic Philosophy 61 (4):304-322.
Aesthetic Knowledge.Keren Gorodeisky & Eric Marcus - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-29.

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