Authorities and Persons

Legal Theory 1 (3):337-359 (1995)
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Abstract

In this article I want to support a certain conception of legal authority. The question I want to address is this: Is it possible to attribute legal authority to a given norm if its authority does not derive from the authority of someone who has issued that norm? Basically, I will try to defend here a negative answer to this question, espousing a personal conception of authority

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Andrei Marmor
Cornell University

Citations of this work

In defense of content-independence.Nathan Adams - 2017 - Legal Theory 23 (3):143-167.
Joseph Raz’s Theory of Authority. [REVIEW]Kenneth Ehrenberg - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (12):884-894.

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References found in this work

Anarchy, State, and Utopia.Robert Nozick - 1974 - Philosophy 52 (199):102-105.
The Concept of Law.Stuart M. Brown - 1963 - Philosophical Review 72 (2):250.
Authority, Law and Morality.Joseph Raz - 1985 - The Monist 68 (3):295-324.

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