Political Theory 15 (3):338-368 (1987)

This essay asks why Aristotle, certainly no friend to unlimited democracy, seems so much more comfortable with unconstrained rhetoric in political deliberation than current defenders of deliberative democracy. It answers this question by reconstructing and defending a distinctly Aristotelian understanding of political deliberation, one that can be pieced together out of a series of separate arguments made in the Rhetoric, the Politics, and the Nicomachean Ethics.
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DOI 10.1177/0090591787015003005
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The Epistemology of Democracy.Elizabeth Anderson - 2006 - Episteme 3 (1-2):8-22.
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