Differential focus in causal and counterfactual thinking: Different possibilities or different functions?

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):460-461 (2007)
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Abstract

In The Rational Imagination, Byrne proposes a mental models account of why causal and counterfactual thinking often focus on different antecedents. This review critically examines the two central propositions of her account, finding both only weakly defensible. Byrne's account is contrasted with judgment dissociation theory, which offers a functional explanation for differences in the focus of causal and counterfactual thinking

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