William James and B. F. Skinner: Behaviorism, Reinforcement, and Interest

Behaviorism 3 (2):140-151 (1975)
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Abstract

Discusses similarities and differences between James and Skinner and criticizes Skinner for failing to provide an adequate description of complex behaviors. Similarities include opposition to a dualistic approach in which mind and body are seen as qualitatively different, and to the notion that mental phenomena are causal entities. In addition, there is agreement that mental events are actions and not copies of external reality. Skinner is criticized for providing an over-simplified account of complex phenomena and translating such a description to operant terms. James is seen as being more painstaking in his description and more cautious in applying general principles. In particular, James's account of the concept of interest is seen as being more cognizant of the subtleties and complexities involved, whereas Skinner's translation of the concept to operant reinforcement is faulted as too narrow.

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