What It is Like to Perceive: Direct Realism and the Phenomenal Character of Perception

New York: Oup Usa (2018)
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Abstract

Thought, including conscious perception, is representation. But perceptual representation is uniquely direct, permitting immediate acquaintance with the world and ensuring perception's distinctive phenomenal character. The perceptive mind is extended. It recruits the very objects perceived to constitute self-referential representations determinative of what it is like to perceive.

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J. Christopher Maloney
University of Arizona

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