Mind 120 (478):263-327 (2011)

Authors
Anna-Sara Malmgren
Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences
Abstract
It is commonly held that our intuitive judgements about imaginary problem cases are justified a priori, if and when they are justified at all. In this paper I defend this view — ‘rationalism’ — against a recent objection by Timothy Williamson. I argue that his objection fails on multiple grounds, but the reasons why it fails are instructive. Williamson argues from a claim about the semantics of intuitive judgements, to a claim about their psychological underpinnings, to the denial of rationalism. I argue that the psychological claim — that a capacity for mental simulation explains our intuitive judgements — does not, even if true, provide reasons to reject rationalism. (More generally, a simulation hypothesis, about any category of judgements, is very limited in its epistemological implications: it is pitched at a level of explanation that is insensitive to central epistemic distinctions.) I also argue that Williamson’s semantic claim — that intuitive judgements are judgements of counterfactuals — is mistaken; rather, I propose, they are a certain kind of metaphysical possibility judgement. Several other competing proposals are also examined and criticized
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1093/mind/fzr039
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

References found in this work BETA

Vision.David Marr - 1982 - W. H. Freeman.
The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.

View all 193 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The Intellectual Given.John Bengson - 2015 - Mind 124 (495):707-760.
Running Risks Morally.Brian Weatherson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):141-163.
Intuition.Joel Pust - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Counterpossibles.Alexander W. Kocurek - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (11):e12787.

View all 52 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Epistemic Value of Intuitive Moral Judgements.Albert W. Musschenga - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 13 (2):113-128.
Moral Intuitions, Moral Expertise and Moral Reasoning.Albert W. Musschenga - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 43 (4):597-613.
Rationalism and Necessitarianism.Martin Lin - 2012 - Noûs 46 (3):418-448.
The Intersubjective Validity of Aesthetic Judgements.Malcolm Budd - 2007 - British Journal of Aesthetics 47 (4):333-371.
Towards a Reasonable Objectivism for Aesthetic Judgements.Elisabeth Schellekens - 2006 - British Journal of Aesthetics 46 (2):163-177.
Balancing Principles in Beauchamp and Childress.Tom Tomlinson - 1998 - The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 4:191-196.
Aggregating Causal Judgments.Richard Bradley, Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (4):491-515.
Kant on Truth-Aptness.Alberto Vanzo - 2012 - History and Philosophy of Logic 33 (2):109-126.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2010-11-25

Total views
1,532 ( #3,309 of 2,505,223 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
50 ( #17,149 of 2,505,223 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes