Hypothesis Testing, “Dutch Book” Arguments, and Risk

Philosophy of Science 82 (5):917-929 (2015)
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Abstract

“Dutch Book” arguments and references to gambling theorems are typical in the debate between Bayesians and scientists committed to “classical” statistical methods. These arguments have rarely convinced non-Bayesian scientists to abandon certain conventional practices, partially because many scientists feel that gambling theorems have little relevance to their research activities. In other words, scientists “don’t bet.” This article examines one attempt, by Schervish, Seidenfeld, and Kadane, to progress beyond such apparent stalemates by connecting “Dutch Book”–type mathematical results with principles actually endorsed by practicing experimentalists

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Citations of this work

To Be Scientific Is To Be Communist.Liam Kofi Bright & Remco Heesen - 2023 - Social Epistemology 37 (3):249-258.
Stopping rules as experimental design.Samuel C. Fletcher - 2019 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 9 (2):1-20.

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References found in this work

Theory and Evidence.Clark N. Glymour - 1980 - Princeton University Press.
Truth and probability.Frank Ramsey - 2010 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. New York: Routledge. pp. 52-94.
Theory and Evidence.Clark Glymour - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (3):498-500.
Theory and Evidence.Clark Glymour - 1980 - Ethics 93 (3):613-615.
Theory and Evidence.Clark Glymour - 1982 - Erkenntnis 18 (1):105-130.

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