Journal of Applied Philosophy 28 (1):93-96 (2011)
AbstractBortolotti's book offers a significant and successful example of the emerging “new” analytic philosophy of psychiatry. Methodologically, it exemplifies a fruitful two-way interaction between philosophy and empirical investigation. Empirical results from cognitive sciences and clinical research are used to constrain philosophical assumptions about beliefs and delusions. Rigorous philosophical argumentation is employed to clarify and adjudicate theoretical interpretations of empirical data concerning the nature of delusion. This work is surely an obligatory reading for those seriously interested in delusions, beliefs and, more in general, the application of an empirically informed philosophy of mind to psychiatry.
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