Abstract
Aristotle draws two sets of distinctions in Metaphysics 9.2, first between non-rational and rational capacities, and second between one way and two way capacities. He then argues for three claims: [A] if a capacity is rational, then it is a two way capacity [B] if a capacity is non-rational, then it is a one way capacity [C] a two way capacity is not indifferently related to the opposed outcomes to which it can give rise I provide explanations of Aristotle's terminology, and of how [A]-[C] should be understood. I then offer a set of arguments which are intended to show that the Aristotelian claims are plausible. \\\ [Nicholas Denyer] In De Caelo 1: 11-12 Aristotle argued that whatever is and always will be true is necessarily true. His argument works, once we grant him the highly plausible principle that if something is true, then it can be false if and only if it can come to be false. For example, assume it true that the sun is and always will be hot. No proposition of this form can ever come to be false. Hence this proposition cannot be false. Hence it is necessarily true, and so too is anything that follows from it. In particular, it is necessarily true that the sun is hot. Moreover, if the sun not only is and always will be hot, but also always has been, then it follows by similar reasoning that the sun not only cannot now fail to be hot, but also never could have failed. Anything everlastingly true is therefore, in the strictest sense of the term, necessarily true.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/1467-8349.t01-1-00067
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 69,078
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Aristotle on Modality, II.Nicholas Denyer - 2000 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 (1):163–178.
Aristotle on Modality.Stephen Makin & Nicholas Denyer - 2000 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes 74:143-178.
Aristotle on Modality, I.Stephen Makin - 2000 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 (1):143–161.
Aristotle on Modality: Stephen Makin.Stephen Makin - 2000 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 (1):143-161.
Reductive Theories of Modality.Theodore Sider - 2003 - In Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics. Oxford University Press. pp. 180-208.
« Tertium non datur » de Norm Van de disjunctie.Cl Schoonbrood - 1951 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 13 (3):418-465.
Aristotle's Two Modal Theses Again.Stephen Makin - 1999 - Phronesis 44 (2):114-126.
Mmountains Are Just Mountains.Jay Garfield - 2009 - In Mario D'Amato, Jay L. Garfield & Tom J. F. Tillemans (eds.), Pointing at the Moon: Buddhism, Logic, Analytic Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 71--82.
The Force of Truth1.Alex Blum - 2011 - Philosophical Investigations 34 (4):393-395.
The Force of Truth.Alex Blum - 2011 - Philosophical Investigations 34 (4):393-395.
The Logic Of Lying.Moses Òkè - 2006 - Sorites 17:27-30.
Propositional Knowledge.Ernest Sosa - 1969 - Philosophical Studies 20 (3):33 - 43.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2017-02-22

Total views
5 ( #1,199,194 of 2,498,932 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #421,180 of 2,498,932 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes