Our errant epistemic aim

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (4):869-876 (1995)
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Abstract

Often the first issue addressed by a theory of justified belief is the aim, goal, purpose, or objective of epistemic justification. What, in short, is the point of epistemic justification? Or, to put it a bit differently, why value justification: why is it worth having or pursuing? Prominent epistemologists, including both externalists and internalists, have proposed the following answer: the ultimate aim of epistemic justification is to maximize true belief and minimize false belief. This answer specifies what I’ll call the “nominal aim,” an aim that gets endorsed by a number of well-known accounts of justification. William Alston, an externalist with certain internalist scruples, is among the most explicit champions of the nominal aim

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Stephen Maitzen
Acadia University

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References found in this work

Why knowledge is merely true belief.Crispin Sartwell - 1992 - Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):167-180.
Why Knowledge Is Merely True Belief.Crispin Sartwell - 1992 - Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):167-180.

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