Thinking precisely about vagueness: an interview with Anna Mahtani

Lse Philosophy Blog (2014)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

How many hairs must a person lose before they become bald? There doesn’t seem to be an easy way of answering this. This is because “bald”, along with a large number of other words, is vague. This vagueness causes problems and Anna Mahtani specialises in thinking very precisely about these problems…

Categories

Keywords

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 83,802

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

Philosophy of Language for Decision Theory Part 2: Indexicals and Vagueness.Anna Mahtani - 2017 - LSE Philosophy Blog.
How vagueness could cut out at any order.Cian Dorr - 2015 - Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (1):1-10.
Philosophy of language for decision theory part 1: credences and preferences.Anna Mahtani - 2017 - Lse Philosophy Blog.
Can vagueness cut out at any order?Anna Mahtani - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):499 – 508.
Vagueness, Truth and Varzi.Gerald Hull - manuscript
Vague Entailment.David Barnett - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):325 - 335.
The instability of vague terms.Anna Mahtani - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (217):570–576.
Generalized Conditionalization and the Sleeping Beauty Problem, II.Terence Horgan - forthcoming - Erkenntnis.
Is Vagueness Sui Generis?David Barnett - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):5-34.
Is vagueness Sui generis ?David Barnett - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):5 – 34.
Does Vagueness Exclude Knowledge?David Barnett - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (1):22 - 45.
Vagueness : a statistical epistemicist approach.Jiri Benovsky - 2011 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy (3):97-112.
I—Columnar Higher-Order Vagueness, or Vagueness is Higher-Order Vagueness.Susanne Bobzien - 2015 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 89 (1):61-87.
Williamson on inexact knowledge.Anna Mahtani - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (2):171 - 180.
An anti-epistemicist consequence of Margin for error semantics for knowledge.Delia Graff Fara - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):127-142.

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-02-19

Downloads
46 (#276,308)

6 months
5 (#165,461)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Anna Mahtani
London School of Economics

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references