Philosophy of language for decision theory part 1: credences and preferences

Lse Philosophy Blog (2017)
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Abstract

Decision theorists and philosophers of language have a lot to learn from one another. In the first of this two-part series, Anna Mahtani looks at the use and interpretation of credences and preferences.

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Anna Mahtani
London School of Economics

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