Abstract

Leibniz shares the enthusiasm of other 17th-century philosophers for mechanism. Nevertheless, Leibniz wants to reserve a very important role for teleology in both his physics and metaphysics. Contemporary commentators have criticized Leibniz's commitment to teleology on the grounds that it is incoherent given several of his other metaphysical doctrines including his otherwise mechanistic view of material bodies, it involves an illicit violation of his own methodological requirements, and it is a matter of mere theological posturing that is of little metaphysical interest. Against this reigning consensus I argue that Leibniz's use of teleology is not only compatible with his broad metaphysical views and his philosophical methodology, but it is also is required by some of his most steadfastly held principles including his views on divine creation and causation in general. Thus, teleology in Leibniz's system in neither incoherent nor an empty gesture made in the interest of Christian orthodoxy. ;Spinoza's and Descartes's rejection of final causality provide the impetus for contemporary critics. Since Jonathan Bennett's theory of teleology avoids this line of criticism, I take it as the starting point for a reconstructed theory of final causality based on an Aristotelian metaphysic. I conclude, therefore, that if Leibniz's approach to final causality can be interpreted along Aristotelian lines it can escape the criticisms alluded to above. ;This approach provides the best way to interpret Leibniz's talk of final causality. Leibniz's critique of occasionalism and his about individual substances, requires him to argue that God would only produce creatures that possessed the sort of natures envisioned by Aristotle, which are inherently teleological. Thus, a robust Aristotelian teleology is exactly the sort of position we should expect Leibniz to take given some of his broader metaphysical. The theoretical fruitfulness of the doctrine of Leibnizian teleology is then explored. In particular, the approach developed in this project is shown to address successfully the problems raised by critics of Leibniz's use of teleological concepts.