?Words lie in our way?

Minds and Machines 4 (4):421-37 (1994)
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Abstract

  The central claim of computationalism is generally taken to be that the brain is a computer, and that any computer implementing the appropriate program would ipso facto have a mind. In this paper I argue for the following propositions: (1) The central claim of computationalism is not about computers, a concept too imprecise for a scientific claim of this sort, but is about physical calculi (instantiated discrete formal systems). (2) In matters of formality, interpretability, and so forth, analog computation and digital computation are not essentially different, and so arguments such as Searle''s hold or not as well for one as for the other. (3) Whether or not a biological system (such as the brain) is computational is a scientific matter of fact. (4) A substantive scientific question for cognitive science is whether cognition is better modeled by discrete representations or by continuous representations. (5) Cognitive science and AI need a theoretical construct that is the continuous analog of a calculus. The discussion of these propositions will illuminate several terminology traps, in which it''s all too easy to become ensnared

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Citations of this work

The philosophy of computer science.Raymond Turner - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Computational vs. causal complexity.Matthias Scheutz - 2001 - Minds and Machines 11 (4):543-566.
Computational versus Causal Complexity.Matthias Scheutz - 2001 - Minds and Machines 11 (4):543-566.
Transcending Turing computability.B. J. Maclennan - 2003 - Minds and Machines 13 (1):3-22.

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References found in this work

The symbol grounding problem.Stevan Harnad - 1990 - Physica D 42:335-346.
Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols.Nelson Goodman - 1971 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 22 (2):187-198.
Is the brain a digital computer?John R. Searle - 1990 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 64 (3):21-37.
Analog and digital.David K. Lewis - 1971 - Noûs 5 (3):321-327.

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