Why facts neither speak for themselves nor resolve the psi controversy: The view from the rational epistemology

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (2):385-386 (1990)
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Abstract

Claims that representatives of both sides of the psi debate (e.g., J. E. Alcock; K. R. Rao and J. Palmer [see PA, Vol 76:10501 and 10507]) have implicitly adopted the empirical epistemology without spelling out or systematically applying the rational epistemology, an essential step for both psychology and parapsychology. ((c) 1997 APA/PsycINFO, all rights reserved)

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