Why didn't you scream? Epistemic injustices of sexism, misogyny and rape myths

Journal of Philosophy of Education 56 (5):787-801 (2022)
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Abstract

In this paper, I discuss rape myths and mythologies, their negative effects on rape and sexual assault complainants, and how they prejudicially construct women qua women. The backdrop for the analysis is the Belfast Rugby Rape Trial, which took place in 2018. Four men, two of whom were well-known rugby players, were acquitted of rape and sexual assault in a nine-week criminal trial that dominated local, national and international attention. The acquittal resulted in ‘I Believe Her’ rallies and protests across Northern Ireland. Of concern were the deeply sexist and misogynistic text exchanges among the acquitted about the complainant and women more generally. One month after the trial, the Criminal Justice Board of Northern Ireland commissioned an independent review of the arrangements to deliver justice in cases of serious sexual offences. The Gillen Review proposed 16 key recommendations, among them measures to dispel rape myths and the role that Relationship and Sex Education in schools could play in combatting these myths. I will explore these issues using Miranda Fricker's construction of epistemic injustice. I argue that there is little appreciation of the profound impact that routine testimonial injustice—where the credibility of a speaker is deflated or undermined on account of her social identity—can have on the wellbeing of speakers and how it ramifies with other forms of injustice. To illustrate, I draw on neurological explanations to show why attributions of sexual consent are unjustly sustained in cases of rape and sexual assault.

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Alison Mackenzie
Oxford Brookes University

References found in this work

Conceptualizing Epistemic Oppression.Kristie Dotson - 2014 - Social Epistemology 28 (2):115-138.
Epistemic Injustice and Illness.Ian James Kidd & Havi Carel - 2016 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 34 (2):172-190.
White Feminist Gaslighting.Nora Berenstain - 2020 - Hypatia 35 (4):733-758.
Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility.James Montmarquet - 1992 - American Philosophical Quarterly 29 (4):331-341.

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