Two dogmas of neo-empiricism

Philosophy Compass 1 (4):398–412 (2006)
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Abstract

This article critically examines the contemporary resurgence of empiricism (or “neo-empiricism”) in philosophy, psychology, neuropsychology, and artificial intelligence. This resurgence is an important and positive development. It is the first time that this centuries-old empiricist approach to cognition is precisely formulated in the context of cognitive science and neuroscience. Moreover, neo-empiricists have made several findings that challenge amodal theories of concepts and higher cognition. It is argued, however, that the theoretical foundations of and the empirical evidence for neo-empiricism are not as strong as is usually claimed by its proponents. The empirical evidence for and against neo-empiricism is discussed in detail.

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Edouard Machery
University of Pittsburgh

Citations of this work

Overcoming the modal/amodal dichotomy of concepts.Christian Michel - 2021 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 20 (4):655-677.
Précis of Doing without Concepts.Edouard Machery - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):195-206.
Précis of doing without concepts.Edouard Machery - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (3):602-611.
Précis of Doing without Concepts.Edouard Machery - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (3):401-410.
Précis of Doing without Concepts.Edouard Machery - 2010 - Mind and Language 25 (5):602-611.

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