Response: Collective Moral Agents and Their Collective-Level Virtues

Public Health Ethics 15 (1):23-26 (2022)
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Abstract

In this short piece, I attempt to respond to some of the challenges raised by Jessica Nihlén Fahlquist and Karen Meagher in their commentaries on my paper, ‘Public Health Virtue Ethics’. While these authors have made many insightful and challenging remarks, I mostly focus on two questions here: first, about the nature of collectives as moral agents, in response to Nihlén Fahlquist, and second, about the concept of a collective-level virtue, in response to Meagher.

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Kathryn MacKay
University of Sydney

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References found in this work

The Meaning of 'Public' in 'Public Health'.Marcel Verweij & Angus Dawson - 2007 - In Angus Dawson & Marcel Verweij (eds.), Ethics, Prevention, and Public Health. Clarendon Press.
Philosophical Plumbing.Mary Midgley - 1992 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 33:139-151.

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