Lewis’s Global Descriptivism and Reference Magnetism

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (1):192-198 (2020)
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In ‘Putnam’s Paradox’, Lewis defended global descriptivism and reference magnetism. According to Schwarz [2014], Lewis didn’t mean what he said there, and really held neither position. We present evidence from Lewis’s correspondence and publications which shows conclusively that Lewis endorsed both.



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Author Profiles

Fraser MacBride
University of Manchester
Frederique Janssen-Lauret
University of Manchester

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Against Magnetism.Wolfgang Schwarz - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (1):17-36.

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