Philosophical Perspectives 25 (1):297-312 (2011)

Authors
Fraser MacBride
University of Manchester
Abstract
This paper provides a new solution to the concept horse paradox. Frege argued no name co-refers with a predicate because no name can be inter-substituted with a predicate. This led Frege to embrace the paradox of the concept horse. But Frege got it wrong because predicates are impurely referring expressions and we shouldn’t expect impurely referring expressions to be intersubstitutable even if they co-refer, because the contexts in which they occur are sensitive to the extra information they carry about their referents.
Keywords concept horse paradox  predicate reference  Frege
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DOI 10.1111/j.1520-8583.2011.00217.x
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References found in this work BETA

Descriptions.Stephen Neale - 1990 - MIT Press.
The Things We Mean.Stephen R. Schiffer - 2003 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Against Cumulative Type Theory.Tim Button & Robert Trueman - forthcoming - Review of Symbolic Logic:1-43.
A Higher-Order Solution to the Problem of the Concept Horse.Nicholas Jones - 2016 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3.
Substitution in a Sense.Robert Trueman - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (12):3069-3098.
The Concept Horse with No Name.Robert Trueman - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1889-1906.
Grammar, Ontology, and the Unity of Meaning.Ulrich Reichard - 2013 - Dissertation, University of Durham

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

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