Human Action and Thomistic Natural Law: Application to the Morality of Contraception
Dissertation, Emory University (
1995)
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Abstract
The controversy over the morality of contraception is commonly framed within the tradition of Thomistic natural law ethics and implies often unstated views on the nature of human action. Among the moral theologians and philosophers who consider this issue, the majority argue in support of the moral permissibility of contraception and only a few in support of the moral wrongness of contraception. This dissertation adds a voice to the minority. The aim of this dissertation is to treat philosophically of the two key theoretical aspects of this issue mentioned above: human action and Thomistic natural law theory. An extensive consideration of both of these topics allows for a reconsideration of the morality of contraception with the help of many implications brought to light and many terms clarified. ;Human acts, i.e., acts that are done knowingly under at least one description and not physically compelled, are subject to various correct descriptions. Among those only a few are relevant to moral inquiry. To determine what sort of action description is proper to moral inquiry the notion of intention is crucial. The key sense of 'intention' in moral action is what can be characterized as the immediate intention, the intention that is one with, or embodied in, the action itself. ;Thomistic natural law theory has its root in Summa Theologiae Ia-IIae, q. 94, a. 2. The natural law consists of several self-evident principles, learned practically, i.e., through moral action, that direct us to those goods the pursuit of which is fulfilling of human nature. The natural law enjoins pursuit of these goods and prohibits all acts that directly violate them. ;Contraception is any action undertaken, in anticipation of the possible results of sexual intercourse, to impede the initiation of a possible new life. All contraceptive acts have as an immediate intention that a new life not begin. As such, all contraceptive acts are acts directed against the good of life, one of the goods whose violation is prohibited by the natural law. Contraception and natural family planning are morally distinguished by their different immediate intentions