Finding order in our world: The primacy of the concrete in neural representations and the role of invariance in substance reidentification

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):78-79 (1998)
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Abstract

I discuss neuroscientific and phenomenological arguments in support of Millikan's thesis. I then consider invariance as a unifying theme in perceptual and conceptual tracking, and how invariants may be extracted from the environment. Finally, some wider implications of Millikan's nondescriptionist approach to language are presented, with specific application to color terms.

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