Abstract
In a recent paper in JVI, ‘An Anarchist Interpretation of Marx’s “Ability to Needs”
Principle,’ Spafford has argued that: (i) the communist and anarchist traditions share
an objection to a particular kind of exchange (which he calls quid pro quo
exchange); (ii) the anarchist objection to quid pro quo exchange can be understood
as opposition to conditional exchange; (iii) consequently, the objection motivates an
opposition to conditional exchange as such (i.e. a commitment to unconditional
exchange); and (iv) we can construct a normative justification of this opposition by
reference to the value of freedom, given that conditional exchange offers diminish the
freedom of the recipients of the offers. In this reply piece I argue that (ii) is importantly
mistaken, and that consequently (iii) also fails. Although all quid pro quo exchanges
are conditional exchanges, the converse does not hold, and we have reason to believe
that there will be instances of conditional exchange that are unobjectionable by the
lights of the traditional anarchist and communist objection to such exchange.
Consequently, an opposition to all conditional exchange rules out too much. However, I
will argue that a suitably modified version of (iv) may nevertheless survive the
counterexamples that defeat (ii).