A simplified proof of an impossibility theorem
Philosophy of Science 40 (2):175-177 (1973)
Abstract
In this paper I prove a theorem which is similar to Arrow's famous impossibility theorem. I show that no social welfare function can be both minimally majoritarian and also independent of irrelevant alternatives. My condition of minimal majoritarianism is substantially weaker than simple majority ruleDOI
10.1086/288513
My notes
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2009-01-28
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