A simplified proof of an impossibility theorem

Philosophy of Science 40 (2):175-177 (1973)
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In this paper I prove a theorem which is similar to Arrow's famous impossibility theorem. I show that no social welfare function can be both minimally majoritarian and also independent of irrelevant alternatives. My condition of minimal majoritarianism is substantially weaker than simple majority rule



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The Theory of Committees and Elections.Duncan Black - 1961 - Philosophy 36 (137):248-249.

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