Abstract

U radu kritički razmatram pokušaj inkorporiranja emocija kao motiva u okvire Kantove etike. U prvom dijelu rada to činim raspravljajući o distinkciji djelovanja iz dužnosti i djelovanja prema dužnosti te o Kantovu shvaćanju pojma moralne vrijednosti. U drugom dijelu teksta analiziram poznati argument kojim se ukazuje na to da Kantova teorija ne ostavlja prostor pristranim oblicima ponašanja. Na koncu nastojim pokazati da taj prigovor ne bi trebalo olako odbaciti te sugeriram da bi prihvatljiva etička teorija trebala omogućiti integraciju emocija u svoju domenu.In this paper I critically examine the attempt of incorporation of emotions as motives into the framework of Kant’s ethics. In the first part of the paper I do this by discussing the distinction of acting from duty and acting in accordance with duty as well as Kant’s understanding of the notion of moral worth. In the second part of the paper I analyze the well-known objection that there is no place for partial forms of behavior in Kant’s ethics. I try to show that this objection should not be easily dismissed and suggest that the acceptable ethical theory should integrate emotions into its domain