Truth as One and Many

Oxford, England: Oxford University Press (2009)
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Abstract

What is truth? Michael Lynch defends a bold new answer to this question. Traditional theories hold that all truths are true in the same way. More recent theories claim that the concept of truth is of no real importance. Lynch argues against both these extremes: truth is a functional property whose function can be performed in more than one way.

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BD171.L8695 2009

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9780199218738   0199218730

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Michael Lynch
University of Connecticut

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